St. John's University School of Law

St. John's Law Scholarship Repository
Bankruptcy Research Library

Center for Bankruptcy Studies

2022

Analysis of Courts' Discretion to Enforce Arbitration of Core
Claims
Sarah L. Hautzinger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/bankruptcy_research_library
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Research Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Bankruptcy Studies at St.
John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Bankruptcy Research Library by an
authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
selbyc@stjohns.edu.

interest in refusing to enforce arbitration. 6 However, without any clear guidance from case law or
the Bankruptcy Code, courts have split as to whether they have discretion to enforce arbitration
of core claims.
This memorandum discusses the applicable considerations in determining whether a core
claim must be arbitrated if a prepetition contract contains an arbitration clause. Part I discusses
the underlying tension between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code. Part II explains the key
distinctions between core and noncore claims. Part III analyzes the split among bankruptcy
courts regarding the discretion a court has (or does not have) to enforce arbitration of a core
claim.
Discussion
I.

A Tension Between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code
The Federal Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code are both statutes that are

“grounded in important policy considerations concerning efficiency and fairness.” 7 Despite their
similarities, the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code have differing presumptions and goals, and when
they diverge, a bankruptcy court must decide which statute will prevail. 8
A. The Overarching Presumption of the FAA
The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a written provision in any contract “to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”9 Furthermore, the FAA dictates that if a suit is brought concerning any issue involving

6

See Allied Title Lending, LLC v. Taylor, 420 F.Supp.3d 436, 448 (E.D. Va. 2019) (citing Stern v.
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 499 (2011)).
7
In re McPherson, 630 B.R. at 166–67.
8
Id. at 167 (discussing the “competing considerations” the bankruptcy court must factor into its decision).
9
9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
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an arbitration clause, the trial must be stayed until “such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.”10 Practically, the FAA “establishes a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements.”11 The overarching presumption of the FAA is that “any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues” must be resolved “in favor of arbitration.” 12
B. The Goals of the Bankruptcy Code
Alternatively, the overarching goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to “balance the rights of
many parties with many different contracts, rights, and interests involving a single debtor.” 13 As
the Second Circuit has explained, the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code include “the goal of
centralized resolution of purely bankruptcy issues, the need to protect creditors and [] debtors
from piecemeal litigation, and the undisputed power of a bankruptcy court to enforce its own
orders.”14
Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to afford debtors the opportunity to a “fresh start
in life” without the burden of “the existence of old debts.” 15 Because it provides a debtorfocused, comprehensive approach to the handling of a bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy court must
be able to hear and resolve claims as efficiently as possible.16 Such a centralized forum for
claims was important to Congress, which “‘intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters
connected to the bankruptcy case.’”17
C. The Conflict Between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code
10

9 U.S.C.A. § 3.
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
12
Moses, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
13
In re McPherson, 630 B.R. at 167.
14
In re Anderson, 884 F.3d 382, 389 (2d Cir. 2018).
15
In re Bogdanovich, 292 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2002).
16
See Moses, 781 F.3d at 71.
17
Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995)) (emphasis added).
11
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Ultimately, when a prepetition contract contains an arbitration clause, a bankruptcy court
must decide whether to enforce arbitration or retain authority over core claims. “It is not the right
to bankruptcy, to discharge or to any substantive right created in the Bankruptcy Code that would
be arbitrated. Instead, the right to have a contract claim decided in the bankruptcy court is at
issue.”18 Claims that are sent to arbitration can “interfere with the debtor’s chance to complete a
fair and efficient . . . reorganization.”19 However, a court’s refusal to enforce arbitration appears
to run contrary to the presumption that courts must “rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate.”20
To determine whether the FAA applies, a court applies the McMahon framework, in
which it first determines whether there is an explicit “contrary congressional command” that
another statute was intended to preempt the FAA.21 Under this framework, a bankruptcy court
must decide whether the claim in a bankruptcy case is core or non-core, as described below. 22
But in general, a bankruptcy court’s finding of a core claim signals that the court may retain
authority over the claim because “the characterization of a claim as constitutionally core is
indicative of Congressional intent to limit arbitration.”23

18

In re Gurga, 176 B.R. 196, 199 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
Moses, 781 F.3d at 74.
20
Shearson/American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
21
See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (acknowledging that FAA mandates enforcement of many arbitration
agreements).
22
See In re McPherson, 630 B.R. at 168 (describing use of McMahon framework as “litmus test” for
resolution of FAA/Bankruptcy Code disputes); see also In re Roth, 594 B.R. 672, 675 (Bankr. S.D. In.
2018) (McMahon allows bankruptcy courts to “balance the competing public policies of enforcing
arbitration agreements and [the] court’s ability to alter the contractual rights of debtors and creditors”).
23
In re McPherson, 630 B.R. at 168; see also In re Taylor, 594 B.R. 643, 651 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2018)
(“Constitutionally core claims strike at the heart of the bankruptcy process Congress has established
through the Bankruptcy Code.”); In re Anderson, 553 B.R. 221, 230 (S.D.N.Y 2016), aff’d, 884 F.3d 382
(2d Cir. 2018) (holding that arbitration of core claims would “necessarily jeopardize the objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code”).
19
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II.

The Distinction Between Core and Non-Core Claims
When a prepetition contract contains an arbitration clause, the forum in which the parties’

claims will be decided hinges entirely on the types of claims that are at issue. 24 There are two
types of claims: “core” and “non-core” claims.25
A. The Standard for Core Claims
In Section 157 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress outlined a non-exhaustive list detailing
which types of proceedings and claims may be defined as “core.” 26 Core claims include “matters
concerning the administration of the estate, determinations as to the dischargeability of particular
debts, and objections to a debtor’s discharge, among others.” 27 This section is a “nonexclusive
list . . . in which . . . bankruptcy courts could constitutionally enter judgment.” 28 Typically, core
claims address “more pressing bankruptcy concerns.”29 As such, bankruptcy courts are “more
likely to have discretion to refuse” enforcement of arbitration of core claims. 30
B. The Standard for Non-Core Claims
In contrast, non-core claims are presumed to include matters not specifically listed in the
Bankruptcy Code.31 The bankruptcy court’s authority is “significantly limited” as to non-core

See Wellness Int’l. Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 670 (2015).
See id.
26
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 157.
27
In re Homaidan, 587 B.R. at 436.
28
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 575 U.S. at 670.
29
In re Anderson, 884 F.3d at 388.
30
Id. (finding claim at issue was core because it “went to the heart of the ‘fresh start’ guaranteed to
debtors” under Bankruptcy Code).
31
See generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 157.
24
25
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claims.32 Non-core claims are “matters that are simply ‘related to’ bankruptcy cases.’”33
Therefore, “the presumption in favor of arbitration usually trumps the lesser interest of
bankruptcy courts in adjudicating non-core proceedings[,]” meaning the arbitration of non-core
claims is typically not at issue.34
III.

A Split Among Courts Regarding a Court’s Discretion to Send a Core Claim to
Arbitration
When presented with a core claim and an arbitration clause in a prepetition contract,

“courts are required to inquire into the nature of the claim and the facts of the specific
bankruptcy to determine whether enforcing arbitration would inherently conflict with the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”35 However, bankruptcy courts across the nation have
grappled with whether they have discretion to enforce arbitration of core claims.
A. The Predominant View: Courts Have Discretion
A majority of courts have concluded that a bankruptcy court has discretion to enforce (or
refuse to enforce) an arbitration clause if a core claim is involved. 36 Although these courts
ultimately arrive at the same conclusion about a bankruptcy court’s discretion to enforce the
arbitration clause, courts differ in the rationales they use to reach that conclusion. As described
below, some courts focus on the parties’ apparent wants, others look to the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code, and still others adopt a policy-minded approach.37

32

In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2006).
MBNA America Bank, N.A., 436 F.3d at 108 (emphasis added).
34
Id.
35
Moses, 781 F.3d at 74.
36
See In re Allen & Hein, Inc., 59 B.R. 733, 734–35 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) (listing various bankruptcy
courts that have refused to enforce arbitration).
37
See, e.g., In re American Classic Voyages, Co., 298 B.R. 222, 225–26 (D. Del. 2003) (parties’ wants);
In re Bill Heard Enterprises, Inc., 400 B.R. 806, 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009) (purposes of the Code); In
re Phico Group, Inc., 304 B.R. 170, 174 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2003) (policy-minded).
33
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If the parties to the suit are apparently in favor of arbitration, a bankruptcy court is more
likely to find that it has discretion to enforce arbitration of a core claim. 38 If the “Debtors [are]
not opposed to arbitration,” and so long as “the arbitration resolve[s]s all matters between the
parties,” a bankruptcy court must analyze whether enforcement of an arbitration clause would be
permissible.39 For example, a Delaware bankruptcy court should have engaged in such an
analysis because both conditions were met: the parties presented themselves as being in favor of
arbitration, and the arbitration would have resolved all matters between the parties. 40
Alternatively, a bankruptcy court may find that it has the discretion to enforce arbitration
of a core claim so long as the arbitration action would not conflict with the objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code.41 As discussed above, the Bankruptcy Code’s underlying purposes are to
provide the debtor with a centralized forum for resolution of all the debtor’s claims. 42 In practice,
if a court finds that arbitration would ultimately “be helpful in the resolution of [the debtors’]
claims,” then arbitration would not “inherently conflict with the underlying purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code,” since the Bankruptcy Code’s underlying objectives center around claim
resolution.43
Finally, policy-related concerns, such as conservation of judicial resources or avoidance
of litigation, permit a court to find that it has discretion to enforce arbitration of a core claim. 44

38

See In re American Classic Voyages, Co., 298 B.R. at 225–26 (noting bankruptcy court does have
“some discretion to deny enforcement of the arbitration clause”).
39
Id. at 226.
40
See id.
41
See In re Bill Heard Enterprises, Inc., 400 B.R. at 812.
42
See Moses, 781 F.3d at 71; see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 851 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989) (noting the “traditional purpose” of bankruptcy legislation is “the reasonably expeditious
rehabilitation of financially distressed debtors”).
43
In re Bill Heard Enterprises, Inc., 400 B.R. at 812.
44
See, e.g., In re Wirecomm Wireless, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-024512008, WL 3056491, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug.
1, 2008).
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For example, enforcing arbitration might allow a court to avoid “potentially unnecessary
litigation in the adversary proceeding,” which helps “conserve[] judicial resources.” 45
Additionally, a court could find that without arbitration, there would be an “adverse impact on
core proceedings” that results in “inefficient delay, duplicate proceedings, or collateral estoppel
effect.”46
B. The Minority View: Courts Do Not Have Discretion
Some courts have held that they do not have discretion to enforce (or refuse to enforce)
arbitration, primarily because the proceedings were not derived from bankruptcy laws. 47
If a debtor fails to “raise any statutory claims that were created by the Bankruptcy Code,”
then there is no conflict between arbitration and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.48 When a court finds there is no conflict, it does not have the discretion to enforce (or
refuse to enforce) arbitration. 49 This would apply, for example, when the debtor’s statutory
claims are based on federal and state consumer protection laws.50 Ultimately, if the debtor’s
claims are not “derived from the bankruptcy laws,” a court may not find that it has discretion to
refuse to enforce arbitration.51
Conclusion

45

Id.
In re Phico Group, Inc., 304 B.R. at 174.
47
See, e.g., In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 232 (3d Cir. 2006); In re Cooley, 362 B.R. 514, 523 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2007).
48
See In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 232.
49
Id.
50
Id; see also In re Cooley, 362 B.R. at 522-23 (no discretion to refuse to enforce arbitration because
debtor’s claims based on Truth in Lending Act, not Bankruptcy Code).
51
Id.
46
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There is an unresolved dispute among courts regarding their discretion to enforce
arbitration of core claims.52 Until there is a resolution by the Supreme Court, bankruptcy courts
face an element of “uncertainty” regarding whether they have discretion to refuse arbitration of
core claims.53

52

See generally In re MF Global Holdings, Ltd., 571 B.R. at 96 (holding court does have discretion to
enforce or refuse to enforce arbitration); cf. In re Cooley, 362 B.R. at 522–23 (holding court does not
have discretion to enforce or refuse to enforce arbitration).
53
See In re McPherson, 630 B.R. at 179 (explaining “the Court dislikes the element of uncertainty” and
lack of “clear authority under the Bankruptcy Code or case law giving this Court more discretion to refuse
arbitration”).
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